On the threshold of the new millennium, technological advances will yield greater understanding of how brain systems organize and produce cognition. In this regard, no question is more intriguing than the underlying structure of knowledge in the human brain. Recent discoveries foretell the solution to this ancient riddle. For example, though our normal visual perception seems relatively unified, studies reveal a mosaic of visual processors dealing with movement, edges, colors, and various other details that contribute to our visual experience (DeYoe et al., 1996; Van Essen, Anderson, & Felleman, 1992) . Mechanisms for comprehending and storing semantic knowledge are likely to be equally if not more complex.
One window into the brain's semantic organization is the growing literature on category-specific naming and semantic deficits. These studies indicate that lesion topography can render some brain-damaged patients unable to name or comprehend items from a specific semantic category. Such findings suggest an underlying organization of knowledge. Living things (or sometimes animals) vs nonliving things is the most commonly reported distinction. Other impaired categories have included fruits and vegetables, tools, body parts, or proper names (see Crosson et al., 1997 , for a brief review). Unfortunately, this literature has failed to resolve the fundamental structure of semantic knowledge that leads to category-specific deficits. Indeed, studies using very similar methodologies have drawn diametrically opposed conclusions. Caramazza and Shelton (1998) recently reported a category-specific semantic deficit for living things which cut across visual and verbal modal-
